DAC8: what Czechia decides for itself

The EU's DAC8 directive on the automatic exchange of information on crypto-assets has applied since 1 January 2026, with the first exchange of data between tax administrations due by 30 September 2027. European law sets the scope of what crypto-asset service providers must report, and ČKMA (the Czech Crypto Association) does not dispute that scope. What DAC8 leaves to each member state is something else: how long the collected data is retained, who may link and search it, and how access to it is controlled. In the Czech transposition bill — Chamber print No. 98, which stalled in the Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies after its first reading — that part is largely unaddressed. The points below reflect the recommendations ČKMA submitted on the bill, based on a detailed study it commissioned, and may be useful to legislators in other member states working through the same transposition choices.

DAC8: what Czechia decides for itself

The new reporting regime will, for hundreds of thousands of users, link identifying data to a multi-year record of their trading activity. Neither the access rules for that dataset, nor the tax administration's own retention period, nor the way access is audited, are set out in the bill text. The Czech Constitutional Court has repeatedly reviewed comparable registries precisely on these points — the safeguards around access and retention — rather than on the fact of data collection itself.

None of the recommendations below reduce the amount of data the state receives under European law. All of them concern what happens to that data afterwards.

Seven recommendations

  1. Drop the place of birth. DAC8 does not require this field, and allows it to be omitted where a provider is not otherwise obliged to collect and report it (Annex VI, Sections II.C and III.C). The Czech AML Act requires that it be established, not that it be reported under DAC8. Every additional data field is, across hundreds of thousands of users, one more reason for an incomplete declaration and a resulting account block.
  2. Cap retention at five years. DAC8 requires the state to retain data for at least five years, and no longer than necessary (Article 22(3)); for providers, it allows a range of five to ten years. The Czech bill sets the upper bound for providers and does not fix a retention period for the state at all, even though a related provision already assumes five years.
  3. Separate mandatory exchange from voluntary onward transfer. The bill allows the tax administration to pass on data on Czech residents to other states on its own initiative, beyond what DAC8 requires, and does not condition transfers to third countries on equivalent protection of confidentiality and personal data. Tightening this does not affect mandatory exchange under DAC8 or other EU obligations; discretionary transfers should require a specific, justified tax purpose.
  4. Protect the most sensitive layer of the data. Outgoing transfers and transfers to addresses outside registered providers should be held separately from the rest of the report. Access should be tied to a specific case file or a documented legal purpose, logged in tamper-proof audit records stating the reason for each query, monitored for unusual access patterns, subject to a four-eyes rule for exports, and technically incapable of bulk-ranking individuals by wealth. Individuals should be able to find out who accessed their data and why. The Czech central registry of bank accounts already works this way; the Constitutional Court's ruling on it (Pl. ÚS 45/17) specifically endorsed the fact that authorities cannot freely search the database at will.
  5. Design for human error, not just system failure. No single employee, administrator or technical account should be able to compile or export a consolidated profile of a person without a further check, and an independent audit of the system should take place before launch. The risk is not only a mass leak: misuse of one legitimate account, where the volume of data accessed looks no different from ordinary work, will not be caught by controls aimed at bulk downloads.
  6. Do not postpone protection because other databases need it too. These safeguards should apply to the new system from the start; a broader discussion of the same standard for other tax databases can run in parallel. That other systems could use the same improvement is not a reason to build this one with the same gaps.
  7. Put the basic guarantees in the law itself. Access conditions, processing purpose, auditability and, in particular, the retention period should be set in the statute, not left to implementing practice. The Constitutional Court requires the state to limit its own data collection where its functions can be secured another way (Pl. ÚS 26/16); it has struck down a blanket registry that lacked access and deletion rules (Pl. ÚS 24/10), and later upheld a comparable one only once such safeguards were added (Pl. ÚS 45/17). The bill's own impact assessment labels this processing as high-risk and large-scale, yet does not assess its impact on privacy.

Support for existing amendments

These points reflect amendments already tabled on the bill by deputies Havránek and Ševčík, and any others in the same spirit. Supporting them is, in our view, the fastest way to address the issue while the bill is still before parliament.

Further reading

The full study underlying these recommendations sets out each point above in detail, with sources for every claim.

Download the full study (PDF, in Czech).

A separate legal opinion on the constitutional dimension of the bill, prepared by the law firm AK Gerloch, is available in Czech: download the opinion (PDF).

We are glad to walk legislators and officials through any of these points individually — contact ckma@ckma.cz. See also Legislation and Regulation in Czechia, European Agenda and Studies and Analyses.